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afety  culture
. Introduction
Industries operating in high-hazard environments must manage
omplex technical and social processes in a competitive economy
ith ﬁnite resources. Investigations of major accidents consistently
dentify how organizations1 have failed to manage this complexity.
evastating events since 2009 include the BP Macondo disaster in
he Gulf of Mexico in 2010, and the PTTEP Montara oil spill in the
imor Sea in 2009, as well as smaller events such as Chevron’s 2012
il spill in Brazil.
Public  enquiries, research studies, and investigations highlight
hat better organizational practices and regulatory oversight
ould have prevented major accidents. Some of the issues iden-
iﬁed include whether the organizations managing facilities
     
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 86488 3581; fax: +61 86488 1006.
E-mail address: mark.grifﬁn@uwa.edu.au (M.A. Grifﬁn).
1 Throughout the paper we use the term “organization” to describe the entity
esponsible  for managing and operating a facility. A range of terms are used across
ndustries and countries (e.g., “duty holder”) to reference the responsible entity so
e use this general term to denote primary legal and management responsibility
or  a facility.
001-4575  © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2013.12.005
Open access under CC BY-NC-NDencouraged questioning of operational data; communicated ade-
quately with sub-contractors; understood and used designated
lines of authority; and effectively managed pervasive cost pres-
sures. These issues raise fundamental questions about the safety
capability of organizations that are ampliﬁed by the rapid rates
change in technology, engineering, and workforce demographics
(Hopkins, 2009; Leveson, 2011a).
There is now a growing need to incorporate a broad view of
the capabilities which allow organizations to operate safely (Grote,
2007) and to understand how safety capability is created, mon-
itored, and improved (Strutt et al., 2006). However, the nature of
safety capability is not well understood or articulated. In this study,
we develop a systemic approach to the safety capability of organi-
zations operating in high-hazard environments. In particular, we
introduce a model of ‘Fitness-to-operate” (FTO) developed in con-
junction with the National Offshore Petroleum and Environmental
Management Authority (NOPSEMA) as part of their stewardship
of a strategic agenda item of the International Regulators Forum
(IRF), a group of ten regulators of health and safety in the offshore
upstream oil and gas industry. The FTO model provides the over-
arching framework for integrating diverse approaches to safety
capability. We  also outline practical guidelines for assessing FTO
that can be used by regulators and organizations.
We deﬁne safety capability as “the capability to maintain
the safety of complex systems operating in uncertain and inter-
dependent environments”. Managing uncertainty is important
 license.
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or operating effectively in both predictable and unpredictable
nvironments, managing interdependence is important for coor-
ination across diverse technical and social processes. Although
afety capability is critically important it is inherently difﬁcult to
bserve: major events occur relatively rarely and are prevented
hrough multiple processes such as appropriate monitoring sys-
ems, effective team communication, and sustained vigilance. We
evelop the concept of “enabling capitals” to describe the observ-
ble characteristics and activities through which organizations
chieve safety capability. In particular, we identify three forms of
nabling capital that we label “organizational capital”, “social cap-
tal” and “human capital”. These three forms of capital have been
xtensively researched within the framework of intellectual capital
o explain how organizations achieve a wide range of capabilities
Kang and Snell, 2009; Youndt and Snell, 2004). Based on our elabo-
ation of safety capability and enabling capitals, we  deﬁne FTO of an
rganization as “demonstrating appropriate organizational, social,
nd human capital to manage safety in uncertain and interdepen-
ent environments”.
The  current paper is divided into three main sections. First, we
eview the regulatory context of offshore oil and gas. We  describe
he progress of international regulators to develop a more sys-
emic view of safety capabilities. Second, we develop a model that
escribes FTO in terms of safety capabilities and the enabling cap-
tals that contribute to these capabilities. Third, we  describe an
ssessment guide for evaluating FTO that has been developed with
OPSEMA. We  describe how we have identiﬁed and developed
easures of the enabling capitals that can be used in ongoing com-
unication between regulators and organizations. We  conclude
ith a discussion of implications and further development of the
ramework and guide.
.  Regulating safety capability in oil and gas
The IRF for Global Offshore Safety brings together regulators
rom Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Mexico, Netherlands, New
ealand, Norway, the UK and the USA. Oil and gas companies
hat operate in IRF member regimes must comply with licences
ranted by these regulators based on national legislative frame-
orks (Australian Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage
Safety) Regulations; Norwegian HSE Framework Regulations,
011; UK Offshore installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005).
or entry to, or to operate in, IRF jurisdictions the regulators must
etermine if organizations possess the necessary competence,
apability and capacity to meet the health, safety and environmen-
al requirements stipulated in the regulations.
Most members of the IRF have moved from a prescrip-
ive to a goal-setting regime for regulating occupational health
nd safety. A guiding principle underlying these goal-setting
egimes, also known as outcome-oriented or performance based
egimes, is that the primary responsibility for ensuring health
nd safety should lie with those who create risks and those
ho work with them. In the Australian oil and gas industry
ontext this means that direct responsibility for the ongoing
anagement of safety on individual facilities is the respon-
ibility of the primary duty holder and not the regulator.
bligations on owners, licensees and operators (duty holders)
f offshore oil and gas facilities are also set out in legisla-
ion.
Regulators use a range of formal and informal systems for
nsuring legislative obligations are met  and to provide insights
nto safety capability. In some regimes (for example Australia
nd the UK) a safety case is an integral part of this assess-
ent process. A safety case is typically comprised of a facility
escription, formal safety assessment description, and safetyd Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171 157
management  description. These items include information about
policy, organizational structure and accountabilities, planning and
standards, performance measurement, audit and review. In other
regimes (for example Norway, Canada and New Zealand) there
are alternative assessment processes to review operators’ appli-
cations. The Netherlands State Supervision of Mines requires a
short document outlining systems and commitments which the
regulator is then able to follow up with more in-depth questions.
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has a similarly
short document for the consent to operate, with much of the sup-
porting information already understood by the regulator through
pre-submission discussions and dialog. In most regimes the regu-
lator must be assured that the operator’s management system is
adequate to ensure compliance with the relevant statutory provi-
sions and that risks to the facility from Major Accident Events have
been reduced to a level that is “as low as reasonably practicable”
(ALARP).
The move from prescriptive to goal setting regimes started
with the 1972 Robens report in the UK, which found prescrip-
tive methods inadequate for assessing and regulating the safety
capability of a facility. This reported resulted in reduced reliance
on volumes of prescriptive legislation but resulted in the regu-
latory challenge of assessing how duty holders met  their goals
(Hopkins and Hale, 2002). Additionally, given recent disasters
and ongoing change in the industry, it is also important to con-
sider the limitations in the adequacy of the safety case and other
assessment methods for assessing long-term capability to man-
age operations in a safe and environmentally sustainable manner
(Leveson, 2011b).
Recent  offshore oil and gas industry accidents have generated
considerable analysis of the roles of human and organizational fac-
tors in these events (Bills and Agostini, 2009; National Commission
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 2011; Skogdalen and
Vinnem, 2011). A challenge for regulators is that these types of
human and organizational factors and their potential impact on
the execution of processes cannot readily be conveyed in a safety
case or similar documentation before operation commences. Once
the facility is operating, visits by the regulator for inspections and
audits provide opportunity to make more direct observations of the
people that work there and the organizational culture. The collec-
tive observations of the inspectors form part of the regulator’s view
of the facility and its ability to meet legislative requirements and
create a safe workplace.
However,  it is still difﬁcult to incorporate complex social factors
such as safety culture in the assessment of safety capability. The PSA
in Norway requires the operator to have a sound safety culture (see
http://www.ptil.no/framework-hse/category408.html#p15 which
notes “culture is not an individual quality, but something that is
developed in the interaction between people”) but there are no spe-
ciﬁc guidelines for assessment or integration with other measures.
Bills and Agostini’s (2009) review of the Varanus Island explo-
sion identiﬁed limited opportunities for the Australian regulator
to address safety culture and leadership within national legisla-
tion. They suggest that FTO concepts provide regulators with a
framework to directly consider organizational issues such as safety
culture, leadership, operator past history, motivation and current
organizational capacity in the regulatory approvals process (Bills
and Agostini, 2009).
To  develop a more systematic view of the many factors that
contribute to FTO, regulators need to create a common framework
for discussion and assessment. To address this challenge NOPSEMA
has supported a research project to develop a model of FTO that will
support inter and intra-regulator discussion of factors relevant to
assessing the competency, capacity and capability of operators. A
goal of the FTO project is to assist inspectors, who come principally
from technical and operational backgrounds, to assess human and
158 M.A. Grifﬁn et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171
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rganizational factors in a structured way using common terms,
eﬁnitions and rankings.
.  Fitness-to-operate: safety capability and enabling
apitals
.1.  Overview
It  is clear that organizations can inﬂuence many of the under-
ying causes of major accidents (Hopkins, 2013; Leveson et al.,
009). However, there is no widely accepted view of the organiza-
ional factors that determine safety capability. A lack of consensus
s not surprising given the wide range of concepts and disciplines
ssociated with the broad idea of capability and its link to safety.
inter (2000, p. 983) described a “terminology haze” surrounding
he deﬁnition of capability making it difﬁcult to integrate diverse
pproaches within a multidisciplinary context.
To address this problem, we adopt a systems perspective in
hich we distinguish the broad concept of capability from spe-
iﬁc processes that build capability. From this perspective, safety
apability is an emergent property that arises through interactions
mong elements of the overall system (Leveson et al., 2009). In
eneral, a capability is derived from the combination of organiza-
ional resources and procedures that can be deployed to meet risks,
hreats, and unexpected changes (Collis, 1994). We  develop the
oncept of “enabling capitals” to describe the multiple processes
hat build and generate safety capability. In particular, we iden-
ify three forms of enabling capital that we label “organizational
apital”, “social capital” and “human capital”.
The distinction between capability and enabling capitals is
mportant because capability is expressed through actions that can
e difﬁcult to observe or that exist only as a latent potential (Grant,d enabling capitals.
1996).  For example, safety capability might only be expressed
in times of crisis or other extreme conditions that occur rarely
or not at all. In contrast to capability, the enabling capitals are
amenable to observation and provide a more tractable basis
for measurement. For example, organizational capital might be
assessed through documented safety systems, social capital might
be assessed through team communication practices, and human
capital might be assessed through safety skill audits.
In  addition, safety capability is likely to be derived from multi-
ple overlapping processes. For example, the capability to respond
to unforeseen emergencies requires a mix  of organizational pro-
cedures (e.g., emergency response plans), social communication
(e.g., effective teamwork), and human skill (e.g., individuals with
appropriate training). Our framework of enabling capitals provides
a means to understand the way these different elements combine
to create capability. Fig. 1 provides a summary of the relation-
ship between organizational capitals and safety capability. The
ﬁgure also summarizes the key dimensions of each capital that we
develop later in the paper.
In short, we distinguish between the capability to operate safely
and the enabling capitals from which this capability is derived.
Below, we ﬁrst outline our view of safety capability and review rel-
evant research regarding high-hazard industries as well as general
literature on capability. We  then review how the enabling capitals
combine to build capability.
3.2.  The nature of safety capability3.2.1. Deﬁning safety capability
Three  approaches have been inﬂuential in understanding the
nature and source of safety capability: high reliability theory
(HRT), resilience engineering, and safety culture. High reliability
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heory provides a comprehensive description of how organiza-
ions maintain safety for long periods in complex and hazardous
nvironments. This approach identiﬁes factors such as strate-
ic prioritization of safety, redundancy in safety systems, and
 strong culture (Weick et al., 1999). A key argument is that
afety capability is derived from collective mindfulness which is
mbodied in systematic preparedness for and response to unex-
ected events referred to “action capabilities” (p. 37). Although
RT has shaped understanding of safety, it has proved difﬁcult to
eﬁne the distinguishing features of High Reliability Organizations
HROs) and the speciﬁc elements that create a HRO (Marais et al.,
004).
More recently, concepts from HRT have been incorporated into
he growing ﬁeld of resilience engineering. This approach argues
hat failure arises from inability to adapt to complexity rather than
s a breakdown or malfunction (Madni and Jackson, 2009). Over-
ll, resilience engineering describes capability as maintaining a
ynamic state of stability in the presence of disruption and threat.
he main characteristics of resilient organizations are the capac-
ty to anticipate, monitor, learn, and respond (Hollnagel, 2011).
lthough resilience engineering builds on the concepts of HRT,
here is little direct connection of ideas linking the two approaches
Hopkins, 2009). Hopkins (2013) has also criticized the lack of inte-
ration across these two areas and limited degree to which they
roduced testable theories or systematic measurement.
Both HRT and resilience engineering identify organizational
ulture as a central element of safety capability. However, the
evelopment of safety culture constructs has progressed somewhat
ndependently of other approaches to safety and risk manage-
ent (Guldenmund, 2000). Approaches to safety culture typically
ocus on the overall value of safety in an organization as reﬂected
hrough evidence of management attitudes to safety, the develop-
ent of safety skills, and communication about safety (Cox and
heyne, 2000). However, analyses of culture do not systemati-
ally include the qualities of mindfulness emphasized by HRT or
he centrality of learning and change emphasized by resilience
ngineering.
Although the various approaches to capability differ in their
mphasis and approach to assessment, they share two fundamen-
al concerns about the nature of capability. First, each approach
eeks to describe how organizations maintain safety in chang-
ng and risky environments. Therefore, there is a strong emphasis
n being vigilant for threats, preparing for unanticipated events,
nd learning over time. Second, there is a recognition that safety
epends on complex interactions among multiple systems. There-
ore, there is an emphasis on issues such as loose coupling of
echnical systems and coordination among social systems. We
ummarize these two core features of safety capability as manag-
ng uncertainty and interdependence which we  describe in more
etail.
.2.2. Managing uncertainty and interdependence in complex
ystems
The  ﬁrst deﬁning feature of safety capability is managing uncer-
ainty in complex systems. Grote (2012) notes that uncertainty is
anaged either though standardization, central planning, and spe-
ialization or by empowering local decision making to respond
daptively to unpredicted events. In high hazard environments
tandardization and planning are essential but there is also ongoing
hange in technology and the operating context that require adap-
ive responses. Overall, a balance between stability and ﬂexibility
s needed (Grote, 2009).The  three major approaches to safety capability emphasize
he need to manage uncertainty through both stability and ﬂex-
bility. Literature in the area of HRT explains the need to adapt
o unexpected events (Roe and Schulman, 2008). Approaches tod Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171 159
organizing for high reliability also emphasize the way complex
systems are managed to maintain stability (Schöbel and Manzey,
2011). Resilience engineering identiﬁes core operational safety
capabilities as monitoring the environment and learning from prior
events (Hollnagel et al., 2011). A key tenet of resilience engineering
is that failure arises from inability to adapt to complexity rather
than from a breakdown or malfunction (Madni and Jackson, 2009).
Research in the ﬁeld of safety culture describes the importance of
aligning individuals and organizational goals and values to achieve
consistent safety outcomes in the face of change (Cooper, 2000).
Learning is typically seen as a fundamental element of a positive
safety culture (Reason, 2000).
Recently, organizational scholars have focused on dynamic
capabilities that describe how organizations adapt and change
to be successful in more volatile environments (Teece, 2007).
Dynamic capabilities describe activities that bring about change
in fundamental capabilities, either by changing existing practices
or introducing new ones (Barreto, 2010; Danneels, 2008; Winter,
2003). Zollo and Winter (2002, p. 340) deﬁned dynamic capabil-
ity as “a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through
which the organization systematically generates and modiﬁes its
operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness”. The exten-
sive research in dynamic capability provides a stronger theoretical
framework for integrating different approaches to managing uncer-
tainty (Anand et al., 2009; Helfat and Winter, 2011; O’Reilly Iii and
Tushman, 2008).
The  second deﬁning feature of safety capability is manag-
ing interdependence within complex systems. Interdependence
describes the connections between different elements of a system
across multiple levels of analysis. The complexity of links within
systems has long been viewed as one of the fundamental causes of
major accidents (Perrow, 1984). For example, tightly coupled tech-
nical systems with strong interdependencies can limit ﬂexibility
and make it difﬁcult to plan for all contingencies.
Interdependence arises not only from interaction among tech-
nical processes but also from the management of multiple goals
within a system. In high-hazard environments, organizations
must manage interdependent goals such as productivity versus
safety (Leveson et al., 2009), centralization versus decentralization
(Weick, 1987), and process versus personal safety (Hopkins, 2009).
These multiple goals go beyond the technical system to incorporate
interdependence of social units. Numerous accident investigations
identify a failure to manage these interdependent goals and pro-
cesses. Managing interdependence in high-hazard environments
requires coordination among tasks, across hierarchical levels, and
between functional groups.
Interdependence  of people and goals is addressed by most safety
approaches but is particularly central for theories of safety cul-
ture. Studies in a variety of industries highlight the critical role of
safety culture in coordinating relationships across multiple groups
(Carmeli and Gittell, 2009). Speciﬁcally, Weick (1987) argued that
a safety culture supports coordination across loosely coupled sys-
tems to increase reliability. Therefore, it is important that safety
culture is integrated into the enabling capital that supports safety
capability.
An important debate regarding safety in complex systems con-
cerns the inevitability of accidents in complex systems. One point
of view suggests that accidents are inevitable due to the nature
interactions among elements of a complex system. Hopkins (2001)
summarized a contrasting view by stating “if accidents are normal,
what makes them so is sloppy management, not complexity and
tight coupling” (p. 72). Our framework extends Hopkins’ stark con-
clusion by developing a more speciﬁc guide to the management
of uncertainty and interdependence in complex environments.
These factors are identiﬁed in the enabling capitals that we  review
next.
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.3. Enabling capitals
Capability  arises through organizational building blocks such as
echnology, structure, culture, and knowledge management sys-
ems (Gold et al., 2001). We  capture this idea in the concept of
nabling capitals. We  identify characteristics of organizational,
ocial, and human capital that contribute to process and per-
onal safety in uncertain and interdependent environments. These
hree forms of capital have been extensively researched within
he framework of intellectual capital (Youndt and Snell, 2004).
esearch concerning intellectual capital identiﬁes the processes,
tructures, and resources through which knowledge is generated
nd transmitted in organizations (Stewart, 1997). This approach
rovides a comprehensive theoretical foundation together with an
xtensive empirical base of research evidence across a variety of
rganizational domains.
Each  enabling capital is distinguished by the basic unit of anal-
sis through which it contributes to FTO. Organizational capital
efers to properties of the overall system such as the organizational
esign and management structure. Social capital refers to capacities
mbedded in social relationships such as the safety culture. Human
apital refers to the skills, knowledge, and motivation of individ-
als to enact behaviors such as speaking up about safety concerns.
lthough social and human capitals are deﬁned at levels of analysis
ested within the organization, they can be aggregated to the orga-
izational level. For example, one aspect of human capital might be
eﬁned in terms of the safety expertise demonstrated by individual
mployees that can then be aggregated to reﬂect the overall level
f safety expertise across all employees in an organization. In the
ext sections we present a conceptual review of each capital.
.4.  Organizational capital
Organizational  capital describes the institutionalized knowl-
dge and routines that reside within organizations (Youndt and
nell, 2004). Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) derived practical
easures of organizational capital based on the way  companies
anaged repositories of knowledge such as databases and on the
ay they embedded knowledge in processes and systems. In rela-
ion to safety, organizational capital describes the various systems
hat enable management of uncertainty and interdependence.
Scholars have demonstrated a variety of ways in which orga-
izational level systems contribute to overall performance. We
dentify three main themes from this research and describe evi-
ence for the link to safety capability. First, a range of human
esource management (HRM) practices have been investigated
nder the rubric of “high performance work systems”. This research
dentiﬁes groups of practices that lead to sustained and superior
erformance (e.g., Huselid, 1995). Zacharatos et al. (2005) showed
hat organizations implementing HRM practices consistent with
igh performance were signiﬁcantly safer over time in terms of
ersonal injury. There is also evidence the effective management of
afety also contributes to better overall performance for an organi-
ation (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2009). Establishing clear empirical
inks between organizational systems and major accidents has
roved difﬁcult because of the relatively low frequency of these
vents (Rosenthal et al., 2006).
A second stream of research explores the routines through
hich organizational processes become an integrated and self-
ustaining part of the organization (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The
apacity to repeat adaptive routines in changing environments is a
allmark of high reliability organizations (Weick et al., 1999). The
otion of routines emphasizes that these processes are embed-
ed in the knowledge structures of the organization rather than
ied to the skills of a particular group or individual. For example,
rom the perspective of routines, emergency response proceduresd Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171
are  an institutionalized sequence of organizational responses and
resource allocations that transcend the skills of particular indi-
viduals. Individual skills are, of course, important and we address
these skills in the section on human capital below. However, it is
important to recognize that organizational routines are maintained
and enacted through an interlinked network of responses that are
“learned” at an organizational level (Shrivastava, 2007).
3.5.  Social capital
Social  capital refers to resources derived from the network of
relationships among people in the organization (Youndt and Snell,
2004). Early work viewed social capital as a resource for individuals.
For example, a strong social network might create better career
opportunities for an individual. More recently attention has focused
on the process through which social capital is a resource for the
overall effectiveness of the organization (Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998). This perspective recognizes that much of the knowledge
developed and used by organizations is embedded in social rela-
tionships and depends on levels of trust within these relationships.
The concept of safety culture is the most well-articulated form
of social capital that has been applied to high-hazard environments.
Safety culture has been repeatedly emphasized by major accident
investigations as a signiﬁcant contributing factor (e.g., Bills and
Agostini, 2009; Group, 2011). Safety culture is recognized as a key
determinant of process safety and developing safety culture is pro-
moted as an essential part of a risk based approach to process safety
(CCPS, 2007).
Despite the importance of safety culture for major accidents,
most research into safety culture has focussed on personal safety
rather than process safety. Nevertheless, this research is impor-
tant for informing a broad view of safety culture that encompasses
management of both personal and process safety. In general, safety
culture describes the values, beliefs and attitudes which are shared
within the social context of an organization (Guldenmund, 2000).
An organization’s safety culture embodies the norms that shape
how individuals interpret and respond to safety events (Clarke,
2006; Quick et al., 2008) and motivates safety-related behaviors
(Nahrgang et al., 2011). Studies in high-risk industries show that
a positive safety culture leads to greater levels of safe behav-
iors (Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Neal and Grifﬁn, 2006), increased
motivation to actively engage in safety behaviors rather than just
comply with them (Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000), and fewer occupational
injuries (Barling et al., 2002).
A social capital perspective highlights that a safety culture
involves effective team work and communication both within and
between teams (Baker et al., 2006). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998)
identiﬁed structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions of social
capital. The structural dimension describes patterns of network ties
and network conﬁgurations (e.g., communication links between
operational and maintenance personnel), the cognitive dimension
describes shared understanding across individuals (e.g., a common
culture of reporting near misses), and the relational dimension
describes the process of norms and trust that enable interpersonal
exchange (e.g., willingness to speak up about safety concerns).
3.6.  Human capital
Human  capital refers to the skills and expertise possessed by
individuals within a particular organization (Youndt and Snell,
2004); it includes technical qualiﬁcations, competencies, experi-
ence, and understanding of process safety risks, together with a
range of personal and interpersonal qualities that promote safety
capability. The personal skills and expertise that underlie individ-
ual safety performance in high risk industries have long been the
focus of both researchers and organizations.
M.A. Grifﬁn et al. / Accident Analysis and Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171 161
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Traditionally, attention has focused on skills such as compliance,
igilance, and perseverance as determinants of individual safety
ehavior (Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000). These behaviors, in turn, support
verall safety in an organization, and thus contribute to organi-
ational capability under routine operating conditions. However,
here is also increasing awareness that individual safety behavior
oes not ensure that the overall system is safe even in fairly sta-
le environments (Hayes, 2012). When we consider the capacity
f an organization to adapt and change in response to internal and
xternal pressures in order to maximize operational safety, other
ersonal attributes are required. This broader set of attributes must
ecessarily encompass the ability to detect early signs of future
ystem disturbances or malfunctions, and the knowledge and
kills to forestall them before they escalate into operating emer-
encies. More generally, these skills and behaviors must enable
ersonnel to respond effectively to complex and changing con-
itions, and to manage unexpected and volatile situations (HSE,
005).
Ericksen and Dyer (2005) describe a range of employee char-
cteristics that drive effective performance in high reliability
rganizations. These favorable attributes and behaviors include the
bility to continuously anticipate and detect operational problems,
nd to communicate extensively with co-workers; the ability to
espond rapidly and appropriately to problems and unexpected
vents, switching tasks and roles ﬂexibly to deal with changing
ituations; the ability to respond to novel or complex problems
ith coordinated and effective actions; and the motivation to
ain a better understanding of operating processes and proce-
ures, and to share such information openly. These characteristics
uggest that human capital include the skills of individuals to antic-
pate and adapt to operational changes, to maintain situational
wareness, to communicate effectively with co-workers, and to
ake timely and appropriate decisions, not only under normal
perating conditions but also in unexpected and rapidly-changing
ituations.mong enabling capitals.
3.6.1. Relationships among enabling capitals
Organizational, social, and human capitals are enabling fac-
tors through which an organization achieves safety capability.
The three capitals capture a wide range of research investigat-
ing how safety is sustained and improve. The distinction between
different kinds of capital is an important advance in our capabil-
ity framework because it allows a more systematic integration of
processes that occur in qualitatively different ways. For example,
Ericksen and Dyer (2005) propose that individual skills identiﬁed
by human capital also serve to enhance its social capital, and vice
versa. To illustrate how processes at different levels might com-
bine to inﬂuence overall safety capability we present two  examples
below.
Fig. 2 depicts a simple example of how the different types of
capital might inﬂuence each other. Moving clockwise from the
top of the ﬁgure, employee recruitment systems might improve
human capital by selecting employees with high levels of safety
skills including interpersonal skills. Individual skills, in turn, help
to build a more supportive safety culture in teams if individuals
are better able to speak up and encourage learning from incidents.
Over time, better team safety practices become embedded in the
organizational routines (Edmondson et al., 2001).
Another example is provided by moving clockwise from the top
of the ﬁgure. In this case, training systems can build social capi-
tal by developing better communication within and between team
members. More effective teams, in turn are able to communicate
information about the overall safety system to new employees.
Over time, this process improves the capacity of the organization
to understand system-level safety (Leveson et al., 2009).
The  brief illustration indicates how our framework helps to con-
ceptualize a wide variety of processes and practices that combine
to build safety capability. The three capitals identify observable and
measurable content of the processes that are necessary for manag-
ing uncertainty and interdependence. We  next review a range of
different approaches to safety assessment to evaluate the extent to
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hich they encompass the content of the three capitals and provide
ractical guidance for developing evaluations.
.7. Assessing capability
We  reviewed different methods of assessing safety capability
o determine the extent they provided coverage of the enabling
apitals in our framework. We  focused on methods going beyond
raditional retrospective approaches based on analyses of incident-
elated data (e.g. event frequency and severity) to provide leading
r prospective evaluations of capability. None of the methods pro-
ided coverage of all enabling capitals, but all methods contributed
o some of the enabling capitals.
Table 1 summarizes eight systemic approaches for assessing
afety capability and notes key references for the approach and
he theoretical foundations. The table builds on research presented
y (Sgourou et al., 2010). The eight models represent a range of
ifferent production and organizational settings, and describe a
ariety of methodological approaches. We  included the offshore
afety questionnaire not only because of the context’s relevance,
ut to provide an example in which safety culture has a prominent
ole in the assessment. Although safety culture is recognized as a
ritical factor in long-term safety and many organizations assess
heir safety cultures, there is little integration of safety culture into
ore comprehensive assessments of capability. We  address this
oint in more detail in Section 5.
The second row of Table 1 indicates that the approaches iden-
iﬁed incorporate a variety of safety and organizational theories,
ncluding socio-technical systems, organizational development,
nd resilience engineering. Although none of the methods con-
idered is based on a conceptual approach corresponding directly
he FTO framework, many individual constructs, especially those
elevant to organizational capital, are incorporated in the existing
ssessment instruments. The third row of the table summarizes the
xtent to which each approach was judged to encompass the three
nabling capitals of our proposed framework. Overall, organiza-
ional capital was the aspect of safety capability most frequently
ddressed by these assessment systems. However, elements of
ocial and human capital were included in various parts of the
ther methods. Only the RAG, MAHS, and SDC methods include
igniﬁcant features from each of the three types of enabling capital.
. Development of the assessment guide
In this section we describe the development of the guide for
ssessing FTO. The goal of development was to produce a practical
nstrument that could be used to support communication between
epresentatives of an offshore facility and the regulator. Because the
nstrument is intended to be used as part of this ongoing process,
t is not designed as a stand-alone tool but as an aid to commu-
ication and evaluation. In the discussion below, we describe the
eneral features of the guide that are likely to be useful for readers
nterested in the assessment safety capability more generally.
In  developing the guide, we aimed to identify dimensions of
nabling capital that that could be readily understood and would
e perceived as relevant by potential participants (e.g. safety
anagers, production supervisors, senior onshore managers, and
ersonnel working in regulatory roles). To this end, although the
ontent was derived from theoretical and published literature,
specially that relating to high technology, hazardous process
ndustries, the guide was designed to apply to the speciﬁc context of
ffshore oil/gas exploration/production facilities. This process was
ndertaken over a period of two years.
The overall hierarchy of constructs developed for the guide
s depicted in Fig. 3. The top part of the ﬁgure shows the threed Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171
capitals  are nested within the overall concept of FTO. The enabling
capitals are further differentiated into seven “dimensions” which
are in turn divided into 27 “elements”. The elements are the focus
of assessment by raters and each element is associated with one
or more speciﬁc characteristics.
Detailed  discussion of all elements and assessment character-
istics is beyond the scope of the current paper. In the following
sections we  ﬁrst outline the meaning and practical content of the
seven dimensions which constitute the three enabling capitals. We
then present our approach to assessing the more speciﬁc elements
of each of these dimensions. This section begins with a review of
existing approaches to safety assessment that provide background
and input for the FTO ratings. We  then outline the procedure that
was developed to rate the 27 elements. Although we  cannot provide
detailed content for each element, we  provide examples that show
how the elements can be assessed in more detail. We  conclude this
section with information about the feedback the guide provides to
participants and regulators.
4.1.  Dimensions of three enabling capitals
Dimensions of organizational capital were developed ﬁrst
because this capital is deﬁned directly in terms of systems and
processes, either currently operating or, in the case of planned
facilities, intended to operate in the future. In contrast, social cap-
ital and human capital can only be assessed in facilities already in
operation because they arise from the actions and interactions of
people working in the environment. A variety of sources were used
to generate potential dimensions including systems and processes
used within the oil and gas industry (e.g., safety cases, self-audit
checklists), best practice examples from other industries such as
aviation (e.g., line operations safety audit; ICAO, 2002), and litera-
ture focused on safety capability. Final dimensions were identiﬁed
through an iterative process involving the research team in con-
sultation with regulators and organizations. Next we provide brief
description and examples of the main content for each dimension.
4.1.1. Dimensions of organizational capital
Organizational capital describes the systemic characteristics of
organizations that give rise to FTO. This resource does not reside
with a speciﬁc individual or part of the organization but depends
on the overall conﬁguration and structure of the organization.
HRM  systems. Selection, training, and performance manage-
ment are critical elements of most HRM systems. There is growing
evidence that organizations committed to safety will implement
practices such as safety in their selection criteria that build stronger
safety values throughout the organization (Zacharatos et al., 2005).
Hopkins (2008) showed how reward systems might prioritize cost
cutting but reduce attention to major hazards. In addition, we high-
light the need for safety leadership systems that formalize the
structure of leadership roles and the processes for building and
maintaining leaders (Zohar and Luria, 2003) and the importance
of contractor management as an integral part of safety systems
(Pinheiro and Kuiper, 2011).
Information systems. The technical and procedural systems
through which information is collected, stored, and communicated
constitute information systems for organizations. A range of formal
supports are available to ensure that information systems con-
tribute safety capability. For example, quality management system
standards (ISO, 2000) provided detailed guidelines concerning the
operation and improvement of information systems. Speciﬁc sys-
tems such as the line operations safety audit in aviation (ICAO,
2002) also embed safety information within decision making pro-
cedures to improve safety.
Processes  and routines. The processes and routines enacted in
organizations encompass formal safety systems and management
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Table 1
Theoretical frameworks for selected safety management assessment systems.
Safety element
method (SEM)
Michigan
OHSMS:
universal
assessment
instrument
(UAI)
Safety
diagnosis
criteria (SDC)
Occupational
health and
safety
self-diagnostic
tool  (OHS-SDT)
OHS
management
system
Resilience
analysis grid
(RAG)
Method for
assessing
health  and
safety
management
systems
(MAHS)
Offshore safety
questionnaire
Tripod-delta Mindfulness
audit
Key citation Alteren and
Hovden (1997)
Redinger and
Levine  (1998)
Tinmannsvik
and Hovden
(2003)
Cadieux et al.
(2006)
Makin and
Winder (2008)
Hollnagel
(2011)
Costella et al.
(2009)
Mearns et al.
(2003)
Reason (1997) Weick and
Sutcliffe (2001)
Theoretical
framework
Organizational
development
theory and
systems theory
Universal
OHSMS model
based  on four
existing  OHS
models
Developed
from the
SMORT (Safety
Management
and
organization
review
technique)
method
Model of
hierarchical
levels  of safety
performance
(Roy  et al.,
2004)
Draws on
literature from
physical  work
environment,
individual
factors,
management
systems
Resilience
engineering
(RE)
Resilience
engineering
(RE)
perspective
Draws on the
offshore  risk
perception
questionnaire
and  literature
on
organizational
factors and
safety  attitudes
Fraws on
literature from
error
management,
organizational
factors  and
human factors
High reliability
organizations
Holistic
features*/FTO
model  ele-
ments/resilience
(RE)  capacities
Organizational
and human
capital
elements, and
their
inter-relations
Primarily
covers
organizational
capital
elements, and
their  inter- and
intra-relations
Organizational,
social and
human capital
elements
Organizational
and social
capital
elements and
their
intra-relations
Incorporates
person, place,
and  system
factors
(organizational
and human
capital)
RE capabilities
and their
interrelations;
organizational,
social and
human capital
elements
Four RE
principles plus
standard  OHS
requirements;
aspects  of
organizational,
social  and
human capital
Organizational
and social
capital
elements
Organizational
capital and
some  elements
of  social capital
Organizational
and social
capital
* ‘Holistic features’ refers to the integration of technical, organizational and human factors, their inter-relations, and their relations with the organizational and external environment, in the development of the assessment model.
Organizational,  social and/or human capital components of the FTO model can also be identiﬁed in the assessment instruments described, while two  assessment methods derive from resilience engineering approaches to safety
management.  Empty cells in the table reﬂect the lack of information in the published documents referenced.
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1Fig. 3. Overview of enabling c
rocesses (e.g., hazard reporting systems) as well as informal proce-
ures such as supervisor safety interactions. Processes and routines
re patterns of repeatable activity which deﬁne an organizations
abitual response to the environment (Becker, 2004). This aspect of
rganizational capital describes how predictable patterns of activ-
ty are implemented in response to critical challenges and demands.
any systems involve formal procedures developed internally by
he organization and required externally by accrediting and regu-
ating bodies. A key aspect of processes and routines is that they
ecome a form of organizational “memory” through which sta-
ility of response is maintained through changing organizational
tructures, resources, and personnel (Argote and Miron-Spektor,
011).
.1.2. Dimensions of social capital
Social capital describes the capability derived from interac-
ions among individuals and their networks of interrelationships.
uilding social capital requires a collaborative organizational envi-
onment that supports data reporting and communication (Youndt
nd Snell, 2004). We  identify two speciﬁc dimensions of social
apital that reﬂect the value of interactions among individuals in
reating safety capability.
Safety  culture. A wide range of concepts are associated with
afety culture and much research has addressed ways of building a
tronger safety culture. A common feature of different approaches
s the need to communicate the intrinsic value of safety and for
ndividuals across the organization to share common safety values.
chieving this level of communication and shared values depends
n the degree of learning and trust that is expressed throughout
n organization (Burns et al., 2006). According to (Reason, 1997), a
ood safety culture has positive features of learning, fairness and
exibility.
Team processes. Teams are the main group structure through
hich social capital is achieved and are implicated in all process of
afety information (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1998). We  use the notion
f teams broadly to capture the variety of interpersonal processes
hat occur through the work activity of individuals (Hackman,
990). Team processes are the communication and coordinationls, dimensions, and elements.
activities  through which teams achieve their safety goals. Research
has identiﬁed activities that support task achievement and main-
tain group commitment across different phases of activity (Marks
et al., 2001). Team processes include encouraging vigilance, sup-
porting others to report hazards and threats, and discouraging team
behaviors that threaten personal and process safety.
4.1.3. Dimensions of human capital
Human capital is the collective knowledge, experience, skills,
abilities, and personal attributes of the people in an organization. It
therefore depends directly on the characteristics of the work force
operating at a given point in time. It is important to distinguish the
human capital that exists within an organization from the orga-
nizational process through which human capital is developed. For
example, effective HRM systems (organizational capital) have the
potential to create a skilled workforce (human capital) but the qual-
ity of these skills can only be determined by assessing individual
skills.
We differentiate two main categories of human capital. The
ﬁrst category is speciﬁc to safety whereas the second category
encompasses the personal qualities important for sustained orga-
nizational operations. Generally, ‘skills and expertise’ includes
cognitive abilities; interpersonal, communication, leadership, and
coping skills, together with more speciﬁc role-related technical
qualiﬁcations and competencies.
Safety  skills and expertise. Expertise refers to an individual’s accu-
mulated knowledge, understanding, perceptions and cognitions
derived from long-term exposure to particular roles, situations, and
environments (Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000) and, in the present context,
to exploration and production processes in the oil/gas industry. For
example, in Australia, the importance of fundamental safety skills
for all employees in offshore facilities has been recognized through
implementation of a common safety training program mandated
across the industry (APPEA, 2013).Personal skills. Research has identiﬁed a range of safety-relevant
attributes such as decision-making, coping with stress, and risk
awareness that combine to create an organization’s human capi-
tal. For example, Ericksen and Dyer (2005) identiﬁed skills related
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o initiative as important for high-reliability organizations. It is not
ractical to create an exhaustive list of personal attributes that sup-
ort an organization’s safety capability. However, the overall proﬁle
f demographic factors such as gender, age, and education can iden-
ify systematic strengths or weaknesses in the level and diversity
f organization’s human capital proﬁle.
.2. Developing rating formats and feedback
In this section we describe development of the practical ele-
ents of the guide. We  ﬁrst reviewed the assessment methods in
able 1 in terms of rating source, format, and feedback to identify
he most appropriate approach and format for the guide. We  then
escribe the process for developing rating systems and feedback.
.2.1.  Review of assessment methods
We reviewed the practical application of the eight assessment
ethods to inform the development of our FTO guide (see Table 2).
ll the assessment instruments reviewed are sufﬁciently ﬂexible to
llow application in different work settings or industries although,
o date, implementation has generally been restricted to a few
omains or only a single domain, and application in other settings
ay necessitate tailoring of assessment characteristics to meet spe-
iﬁc requirements.
Practical application of several of the assessment methods
equires a basic understanding of the underlying conceptual model,
nowledge of the industry involved, and experience of rating the
onstructs concerned. Thus, the UAI and OHS methods rely on
atings by specialist auditors, using people, observations, and avail-
ble documents as sources of information. Assessment of resilience
apabilities presents particular challenges, thus, the RAG and MAHS
esilience assessments combine information obtained from multi-
le sources such as focus groups, interviews, document reviews,
bservations, and discussion with experts. The SEM, SDC, and
HS-SDT methods are less demanding of auditing expertise and
ssessments can be made by employees of the organization con-
erned.
Most of the methods reviewed use multiple evaluation elements
ranging from 12 elements for SEM, to 140 for SDC), and a ﬁve-point
ating scale for responses; higher ratings reﬂect better safety man-
gement. Notably, both the SEM and the RAG have an assessment
ormat similar to that of capability maturity models (Macgillivray
t al., 2007; Strutt et al., 2006), in that upward progression through
uccessive stages implies the attainment of greater maturity. For
eporting purposes, assessment data are normally aggregated or
ummarized using mean or total scores (UAI and SDC), hazard
roﬁles (OHS management system), a matrix showing the stage
eached on different assessment components (SEM), or graphical
lots and charts (RAG).
.2.2.  Assessing FTO elements: characteristics, questions, and
atings
The  project team developed speciﬁc elements to represent
ach of the dimensions based on previous research, assessment
pproaches, and workshops. For each element, one or more char-
cteristics were identiﬁed at a level of speciﬁcity suitable for
ssessment by raters. The characteristics were deﬁned so that
aters, working either individually or in small groups, could assess
he current level of each characteristic with appropriate infor-
ation from sources such as observation, documentary evidence,
nterview, or questionnaire. Each characteristic was elaborated
ith more open-ended questions to guide thinking about the oper-
tional meaning of the characteristic.
Each characteristic is rated using two criteria designed to
ncompass the depth and breadth of each characteristic. This
rocess for rating a characteristic is analogous to combiningd Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171 165
attributes in a risk assessment (Cameron and Raman, 2005). Depth
refers to the quality or level of a characteristic while breadth
refers to the extent it encompasses the whole organization. The
deﬁnition of depth and breadth differed somewhat across the
three enabling capitals to reﬂect the different content in each
capital.
Table 3 shows how the two criteria combine for the characteris-
tics within each of the enabling capitals. The descriptors in the left
hand columns capture depth of coverage while the descriptors in
rows capture breadth for characteristics in the three capitals. For
organizational capital, the depth descriptors concern the degree of
compliance and the breadth descriptors concern the coverage of
systems and documentation. For social capital, the depth descrip-
tors concern the consistency of attaining each characteristic and
the breadth descriptors concern the coverage of across teams in
the organization. For human capital, the depth descriptors con-
cern the overall level of attainment for each characteristic and the
breadth descriptors concern the coverage of across individuals in
the organization
For  each characteristic, a ﬁnal rating score is derived by com-
bining the scores on the two axes of the matrix. For example,
a rating of 3 is achieved by a high score on one axis combined
with an intermediate score on the other axis. Similarly, joint mini-
mum scores on both axes result in a rating of 0, while a maximum
rating of 4 can only be achieved if high scores are assigned on
both axes. To guide the rating of each characteristic, a range of
evidence can be used such as process maps and documents, along-
side records which demonstrate that the process is being used
as designed, and that compliance is assessed regularly and sys-
tematically. Once a rating for a characteristic is determined it is
recorded in a summary document that summarizes the charac-
teristic in relation to the FTO elements, dimensions, and enabling
capitals. Table 4 provides an example of one characteristic in
the guide summary. The examples show that different combi-
nations of breadth and depth can result in an overall moderate
score.
4.2.3. Feedback generated by the FTO assessment
After the rating process has been completed for all the FTO char-
acteristics, various types of feedback can be generated to represent
the facility’s current level of FTO. One advantage of the FTO guide
is that it allows immediate presentation of FTO feedback. Thus,
aggregated scores are computed, and converted into percentages of
the maximum possible scores, using macro routines in the spread
sheet software used for the guide. For example, the feedback infor-
mation can be presented in the form of graphical radar plots that
allow visual comparison across different dimensions as shown in
Fig. 4.
By  examining the feedback information provided, organiza-
tions and regulators can gain insight into how performance across
organizational, social and human capital compares, and if any
one type of capital falls below an acceptable standard. More
detailed information can be derived by examining the proﬁle of
ratings across individual characteristics, and identifying speciﬁc
short-comings which require attention. If the guide is applied
industry-wide, operators can use it for benchmarking FTO on their
facility against industry leaders and recognized industry standards.
Also, by repeating the FTO assessment at regular intervals over an
facility’s life cycle, the effect of any improvement efforts can be
assessed.5. Discussion
The FTO model and guide presented in this paper provide a new
framework for understanding and assessing safety capability. The
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Table 2
Features of selected safety management assessment systems.
Safety  element
method  (SEM)
Michigan
OHSMS:
universal
assessment
instrument
(UAI)
Safety
diagnosis
criteria (SDC)
Occupational
health  and
safety  self-
diagnostic
tool
(OHS-SDT)
OHS
management
system
Resilience
analysis grid
(RAG)
Method for
assessing
health and
safety
management
systems
(MAHS)
Offshore safety
questionnaire
Tripod-
delta
Mindfulness
audit
Industry  Mining  and
other high  risk
industries
Public and
private  sector
organizations
Production
industries
Semi-
autonomous
work
groups in
various
industries
Any industry,
but with  a  focus
on smaller
businesses
Any industry;
used  in  rail,
healthcare,  and
offshore
Any industry;
used  in
manufacturing,
aviation,
electricity
Offshore Oil
exploration
and
production
Any industry
Tool  users/intended
users
Practitioners/
employees
Auditors Employees
from  all
organizational
levels
Employees Auditors  Selected
employees
with  domain
expertise
Team of
examiners,
with internal
and external
assessors
Employees Employees  Employees
Sources  of
information
Individual
assessments  by
managers and
employees,
which are
combined  in  a
consensus
process
Auditor
assessment of
documents,
ﬁeld notes,
interviews  with
OHS personnel
Employees’
survey
responses
Employees’
survey
responses
Risk
assessments
require
technical
competence,
knowledge of
the workplace
and  risk
assessment
skills
Focus groups;
inter-views;
discussions
with experts.
Standard  items
tailored to
provide
domain-
speciﬁc
questions
Document
analysis,
Interviews, and
direct
observation
used to  obtain
structural,
performance,
and operational
data
Employees’ survey
responses
Documentation
and obser-
vations  by
an
employee
Employees’
responses
Assessed  elements 6 27  13  9  3  4  7  7  11  9
Sub-elements  12  118  140  67  57  38  112  45  220  85
Scoring/rating
method
Data  identiﬁes
ﬁve progressive
stages  for  each
element (coded
1–5)
Ratings of  27
sections (in  5
categories)
covering 118
OHSMS
principles,  and
486
measurement
criteria
Sub-elements
scored 0–1.
Evaluation
elements,  and
overall
assessment,
scored on  a
5-point scale
10-point
rating  scale
for each
survey  item
Risk  ratings  on
0–4 scale  for
each
component
item
Rating scale
from ‘Excellent’
to ‘Deﬁcient’  in
5 steps,  plus  a
zero ‘No
capability’
rating
Assessment of
items in
relation  to  a
pre-
determined
matrix scoring
The  rating  scale  is
different for  each
element (either  a
5-point or  3-point
scale). Descriptors
such as  ‘fully  agree’
to ‘fully  disagree’
Checklist  –
yes/no
response
for each
indicator.
Each  GFT
has 20
indicators
The rating  scale
is different  for
each element
(either  3-point
scale or
agree/disagree).
Descriptors
such as  ‘not  at
all’ to  ‘a  great
deal’ are  used
Presentation  of
results
Matrix  showing
actual stage
and desired
future  stage  for
each of  the  six
safety
elements, plus
score totals
Scores  summed
for each
principle,
aggregated  for
each UAI
section,  and
aggregated
across sections
Scores  on
general
management
and
safety-speciﬁc
management
derived  from
evaluation
elements
– Hazard  proﬁles
for safe  place,
safe person,
and safe
systems,  before
and after
interventions
Graphical
(radar) plots  for
each of  the  4
elements; star
chart with  4
axes for
aggregated
results
Assessment
report prepared
by the  team  of
examiners
Assessment report
prepared by
developers  that
provide a  variety  of
results  and
comparisons
Bar  charts
indicate  the
areas of
most
concern,
requiring
immediate
attention
Scores are
tallied  and
scores
lower/higher
than a  speciﬁed
number
indicate  the
need for
improvement
Validity  Satisfactory  Under
evaluation
Satisfactory Further
validation
needed
– –  –  Satisfactory  –  –
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Table  3
Matrix for rating characteristic within the three enabling capitals.
Organizational capital
Depth  – level of
compliance (roles and
resources  assigned)
Systematic and proactive compliance
testing on a scheduled basis
1  3 4
(Reactive) Compliance testing in
response to internal or external events
1 2 3
Informal  (roles and resources not
assigned) compliance testing
0 1 1
Informal systems
and  processes in
place
Systems  and
processes in place
and  documented
Systems and
processes are
documented,
reviewed  and
improved regularly
Breadth  – systems and documentation
Social capital
Depth  – consistency of
attainment
Teams  always exhibit this
characteristic
1 3 4
Teams  generally exhibit this
characteristic
1 2 3
Teams  seldom or never exhibit this
characteristic
0 1 1
(None  or) few
teams
Some  teams Most or all teams
Breadth  – coverage across the organization
Human capital
Depth  – level of attainment Demonstrate an exemplary level of this
characteristic
1 3 4
Demonstrate basic competency of this
characteristic
1 2 3
Demonstrate little or nothing of this
characteristic
0 1 1
(None  or) few
individuals
Designated
individuals
Most or all
individuals
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Euide was developed as a resource for regulators and operators
n the offshore oil and gas industry but is relevant to any industry
perating in high-risk and dynamically changing environments.
he framework has a number of positive features to enable a
ore holistic and systemic approach to safety capability. Below
e outline how the conceptual framework and guide support a
umber of practical applications around FTO. We  then discuss
ome issues for further development and application.
able 4
xample characteristic of the element performance management systems.
Organizational capital
Human  resources systems: performance management systems
Characteristic Critical questions 
Systematic performance management
processes
Have you ensured performance man
processes are ﬁt for purpose such as:
• Use of appropriate sources of perfo
information?
• Constructive use of performance
information?
• Appropriate oversight?
•  Objectivity?
Relationship with position requirem
performance plans?Breadth  – coverage across the organization
5.1. Contributions of the FTO framework
We discuss three ways that the FTO framework helps to better
understand safety in high-risk environments. First, the framework
develops a more systematic deﬁnition of safety capability based on
achieving safety in uncertain and interdependent contexts. Second,
the framework recognizes that safety capability itself is difﬁcult
to observe and outlines how enabling capitals can be evaluated
Level Level descriptions Score
agement
rmance
ents and
Level 4 Performance management
processes  are systematically tested
on a regular basis and functional
requirements  are periodically
reviewed  against broader internal
and external requirements and
inputs

Level  3 Performance management
processes  are updated to meet
internal or external changes

Level 2 Performance management
processes  meet functional
requirements  and are being
implemented  by appropriately
competent  people

Level 1 Performance management
processes  are documented and
used or available for use

Level 0 Performance management
processes  are ad-hoc or informal

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o understand underlying safety capability. Third, the framework
elps to integrate important concepts such as safety culture, orga-
izational learning, and resilience in to a more coherent set of
easures.
.1.1. Uncertain and interdependent contexts
Our framework adopts a systems perspective to identify uncer-
ainty and interdependence as fundamental issues that must be
anaged to minimize risk. These concepts have been central
o debate about the characteristics of complex systems in haz-
rdous environments (Hopkins, 2013; Perrow, 1984; Rijpma, 1997;
oberts, 1990). By deﬁning FTO in relation to uncertainty and inter-
ependence, the framework contributes to ongoing integration of
ystems thinking into the management of safety.
Leveson et al. (2009) note that organizations in high-risk envi-
onments must manage signiﬁcant levels of uncertainty together
ith changing technical processes in competitive economic mar-
ets. They argue that these conditions were not adequately
ecognized in earlier debates about normal accidents and high
eliability. More recent analyses of high reliability, resilience engi-
eering, and safety culture emphasize the importance of learning,
hange, and adaption.
By  incorporating uncertainty as a core feature of our framework,
e highlight the need for organizations to manage both stability
nd change. This challenge is complex because change and stability
re often viewed as opposites (Farjoun, 2010). The FTO framework
s based on the premise that safety requires processes and pro-
edures that maintain stable operations in the face of change as
ell as new operations that anticipate and generate change. The
eed for ongoing change has been emphasized in a range of recent
pproaches to safety capability. For example, Woods (2011, p. 124)
tates “resilience is about how systems learn to modulate their
daptive capacities to continuously update their ﬁtness relative
o an environment”. Change and stability are identiﬁed at all lev-
ls of the framework. For example, within organizational capital
imension “processes and routines” we identify elements that sup-
ort stability such as “safety critical activities” (e.g., responding to
mergencies) and “learning” (e.g., learn from internal monitoring
ata).
The concept of interdependence also helps to integrate systems
hinking into safety management. It has long been recognized that
ightly coupled systems contribute to risk by increasing interactive
omplexity in hazardous environments (Perrow, 1984). Although
he original concept of loose-coupling incorporated both techni-
al and social processes (Orton and Weick, 1990), interdependencement human resources systems.
in  technical systems has been viewed somewhat separately from
interdependence among human and social processes. The frame-
work helps to identify and integrate social processes that are
necessary to manage interdependent systems. For example, trust
is increasingly seen as a necessary condition for effectively coordi-
nating interdependence in high reliability organizations (Cox et al.,
2006). Trust underpins appropriate communication about hazards
necessary for monitoring, response, and anticipation. The frame-
work identiﬁes trust as a key element of safety culture that links
social processes to the systems that support reliability and safety.
We discuss this point further below.
5.1.2. Differentiating enabling capital from capability
A further beneﬁt of the framework is the distinction between
enabling capitals that produce capability and the more abstract
notion of capability itself. The major focus of both the framework
and the guide is enabling capital which comprises observable fac-
tors that produce capability. The distinction provides a rationale
for assessing facilities in terms of their actual operations rather
than the potential outcomes. As discussed below, regulators need
to understand the potential capabilities that will be enacted before
a facility is operational.
A  further beneﬁt of differentiating enabling capital and capa-
bility is the opportunity to build a more comprehensive map  of
leading and lagging indicators for safety. A continuing challenge
for an integrated picture of safety is the complex link between dis-
tal events and ultimate outcomes of harm and failure, particularly
low-frequency events (Hopkins, 2009). There is good evidence from
safety research and other areas of organizational operation that
the enabling capitals inﬂuence safety outcomes. In this sense, the
enabling capitals are a systematic picture of leading indicators that
precede harm and failure. Companies, regulators, and researchers
can use the elements of enabling capital to develop a more nuanced
picture of potential lead indicators and build more comprehensive
picture of safety capability.
The  distinctions within the framework also allow a logical
extension to the safety case currently used by regulators as the
principal mechanism for determining FTO (Maguire, 2008). A safety
case generally includes management system elements such as pol-
icy, organizational structure and accountabilities, planning and
standards, performance measurement, audit and review. In pre-
senting the safety case, an operator identiﬁes potential risks and
the organizational capabilities that will be in place to minimize and
manage risk. The safety case as an approach is largely unchanged
since its inception in the aftermath of Piper Alpha in 1988 and
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he changes to offshore health and safety regimes following the
ecommendations of the Cullen enquiry (Cullen, 1990). The FTO
ramework addresses capability in a way that allows for a wider
ange of risks in a more dynamic and changing environment.
he speciﬁcation of enabling capitals identiﬁes the characteris-
ics needed to respond in an environment with rapid technological
hange, reduced time to test new designs and systems, new types
f hazards, increased complexity and coupling, and more complex
elationships between humans and automation.
.2. Safety culture
A  signiﬁcant contribution of the FTO framework is the system-
tic inclusion of safety culture into a broad assessment guide. Safety
ulture is widely recognized as a critical factor for creating and
upporting a safe organization. However, the concept of culture is
ften invoked to cover an extremely broad range of factors that
ontribute to safety. Safety culture is identiﬁed as a causal factor
n many accident and disaster reports, yet has proved difﬁcult to
eﬁne and manage (Cox and Flin, 1998; LeCoze, 2013). Over the
ast decades, safety culture tools have been used to assess vari-
us elements of organizational, social and human capital including
ndividual motivations, group processes, job characteristics, orga-
izational norms, and safety management systems. A limitation
f this broad coverage, as noted in our review of assessment
ystems, is that safety culture is often assessed as part of stand-
lone measurement procedure. Although this approach results in
omprehensive assessment of safety culture, it does not provide
ystematic links to other elements of the framework such as the
afety skills in human capital or the monitoring systems in organi-
ational capital.
To  enable better integration of safety culture assessment, the
TO framework provides a more speciﬁc and constrained concep-
ualization of the social foundations of culture. (Bills and Agostini,
009) emphasized the need for regulators to incorporate safety cul-
ure into broader assessments used in regulating entry and ongoing
peration of offshore facilities. By specifying the content of safety
ulture in terms of social capital our framework provides greater
onceptual clarity for regulators and operators as well as a more
ystematic link between safety culture assessment and other forms
f safety assessment.
.3.  Further development
The  FTO framework and guide is an ongoing project which
ill be developed and reﬁned through further consultation with
ndustry and research partners. The guide encourages the integra-
ion of multiple approaches to measurement but remains limited
y the degree to which these measures can gather reliable data
nd produce valid conclusions. Some of the key areas for further
evelopment include building links to other measurement systems,
ncorporating complex patterns of FTO, and supporting whole-of-
ife approaches to safety.
.3.1.  Link to other capability assessment
Researchers in the ﬁeld of resilience engineering have developed
ssessments that place an emphasis on ﬂexibility and anticipation
Hollnagel et al., 2011). The key dimensions identiﬁed by resilience
ngineering identify important elements of safety capability. It
s possible to provide conceptual links between the elements of
nabling capital and the dimensions of ability to respond, antic-
pate, monitor and learn identiﬁed in the resilience analysis grid
RAG). Current research is investigating the validity and utility of
inking ratings of enabling capitals with assessment obtained from
he RAG. A promising future direction involves weighting the indi-
idual characteristics of the FTO framework on the extent to whichd Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171 169
they  encompass the abilities identiﬁed by the RAG. This weighting
would allow a map  of the RAG abilities to be produced based on
the ratings of the enabling capitals. Research is needed to examine
the extent to which reliable weightings can be allocated and the
validity of the link between enabling capitals and capability.
5.4.  Alignment and ﬁt
The  alignment between the dimensions in the framework is
an important part of overall safety capability that is not currently
addressed in the guide. Organizational researchers have empha-
sized the need to understand the conﬁguration of practices that
lead to effective outcomes beyond the effectiveness of single prac-
tices or processes (Delery and Doty, 1996). The notion of alignment
means that safety capability is not achieved simply by high levels
of enabling capitals but also by the speciﬁc combinations of the
elements of enabling capital. For example, if there are high lev-
els of automated systems for monitoring (organizational capital)
then there needs to be high levels of vigilance from the operators
of these systems (human capital) and strong communication pro-
cedures developed by leaders and supervisors (social capital). This
alignment means that the range of higher and lower scores in an
assessment can have different meanings depending on the pattern
of scores and the context in which they are produced. It is important
to develop the overall guide in a way  that recognizes how strengths
in one area might be complemented by or depend on strengths in
another area (Lepak et al., 2005).
5.5. Whole-of-life approach
Our  framework conceptualizes FTO as an ongoing capability
determined by enabling capitals that evolve over the life-span of
a facility. This whole-of-life perspective is seen as critical for suc-
cessfully managing projects, infrastructure, and facilities (Kerzner,
2001). There is also increasing recognition of the need for inno-
vation and change to be integrated into the control systems of a
project’s life cycle (Lenﬂe and Loch, 2010).
Regulation of offshore facilities has typically focused on estab-
lishing initial conditions for FTO, with less opportunity for
regulators to develop an overview of the longer term life-cycle
incorporating change and continuous development. The FTO frame-
work provides a means for understanding how capability prior to
entry into the regime integrates ongoing development of the facil-
ity. Further research and consultation will enable development of
the guide to inform understanding of capability from the design and
start-up of the facility through the development of mature oper-
ating capabilities. For example, when a facility is being designed,
built, or moved to place, the concept of enabling capitals provides
guidance in determining the factors that can be assessed earlier in
the lifecycle (e.g. safety reporting systems) and monitoring other
enabling factors as they come on line (e.g., employee safety skills).
6. Conclusion
The FTO framework and guide presented in this paper support
a systemic and comprehensive approach to safety over the life-
time of a facility. The need for high reliability and responsiveness
to change and means that it is important for regulators and oper-
ators to recognize the key factors that inﬂuence safety capability.
The FTO framework identiﬁes organizational, social, and human
factors that combine to create the safety capability of a facility. The
systemic nature of the framework encourages integration of safety
culture and human skill with the organizational procedures and
processes that enable reliability and adaptability.
1 sis an
R
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
E
E
F
F
G
G
G
G
G70 M.A. Grifﬁn et al. / Accident Analy
eferences
lteren, B., Hovden, J., 1997. The safety element method – a user developed tool for
Improvement of safety management. Safety Science Monitor 1 (3), 493–509.
nand, G., Ward, P.T., Tatikonda, M.V., Schilling, D.A., 2009. Dynamic capabilities
through  continuous improvement infrastructure. Journal of Operations Man-
agement  27 (6), 444–461.
PPEA,  2013. Safety competency programs, Retrieved from http://www.appea.
com.au/safety-environment/safety-competency-programs
rgote,  L., Miron-Spektor, E., 2011. Organizational learning: from experience to
knowledge. Organization Science 22 (5), 1123–1137.
ustralian Commonwealth Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety)
Regulations, 2009.
aker,  D.P., Day, R., Salas, E., 2006. Teamwork as an essential component of high-
reliability organizations. Health Services Research 41 (4), 1576–1598.
arling, J., Loughlin, C., Kelloway, E.K., 2002. Development and test of a model linking
safety-speciﬁc transformational leadership and occupational safety. Journal of
Applied Psychology 87 (3), 488–496.
arreto, I., 2010. Dynamic capabilities: a review of past research and an agenda for
the future. Journal of Management 36 (1), 256–280.
ecker, M.C., 2004. Organizational routines: a review of the literature. Industrial and
Corporate Change 13 (4), 643–678.
ills, K., Agostini, D., 2009. Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation: Better Practice and
the Effectiveness of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority. Common-
wealth  of Australia, Canberra.
urns, C., Mearns, K., McGeorge, P., 2006. Explicit and implicit trust within safety
culture. Risk Analysis 26 (5), 1139–1150.
adieux, J., Roy, M., Desmarais, L., 2006. A preliminary validation of a new measure
of  occupational health and safety. Journal of Safety Research 37 (4), 413–419.
ameron, I.T., Raman, R., 2005. Process Systems Risk Management, vol. 6. Academic
Press, New York.
armeli,  A., Gittell, J.H., 2009. High-quality relationships, psychological safety, and
learning from failures in work organizations. Journal of Organizational Behavior
30  (6), 709–729.
CPS, 2007. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. Wiley, NJ.
larke, S., 2006. The relationship between safety climate and safety performance:
a  meta-analytic review. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 11 (4),
315–327.
ollis,  D.J., 1994. Research note: how valuable are organizational capabilities? Strate-
gic Management Journal 15, 143–152.
ooper, M.D., 2000. Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science 36 (2),
111–136.
ooper,  M.D., Phillips, R.A., 2004. Exploratory analysis of the safety climate and safety
behavior relationship. Journal of Safety Research 35 (5), 497–512.
ostella,  M.F., Saurin, T.A., de Macedo Guimarães, L.B., 2009. A method for assessing
health and safety management systems from the resilience engineering per-
spective. Safety Science 47 (8), 1056–1067.
ox, S., Cheyne, A.J.T., 2000. Assessing safety culture in offshore environments. Safety
Science 34 (1), 111–129.
ox,  S., Flin, R., 1998. Safety culture: philosopher’s stone or man  of straw? Work and
Stress 12 (3), 189–201.
ox,  S., Jones, B., Collinson, D., 2006. Trust relations in high-reliability organizations.
Risk  Analysis 26 (5), 1123–1138.
ullen, H.L., 1990. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. HMSO, London.
anneels, E., 2008. Organizational antecedents of second-order competences.
Strategic  Management Journal 29 (5), 519–543.
elery, J.E., Doty, D.H., 1996. Modes of theorizing in strategic human resource man-
agement: tests of universalistic, contingency, and conﬁgurational performance
predictions.  Academy of Management Journal 39 (4), 802–835.
dmondson,  A.C., Bohmer, R.M., Pisano, G.P., 2001. Disrupted routines: team learn-
ing and new technology implementation in hospitals. Administrative Science
Quarterly  46 (4), 685–716.
ricksen,  J., Dyer, L., 2005. Toward a strategic human resource management model of
high reliability organization performance. The International Journal of Human
Resource Management 16 (6), 907–928.
arjoun, M.,  2010. Beyond dualism: stability and change as a duality. Academy of
Management Review 35 (2), 202–225.
ernandez-Muniz, B., Montes-Peon, J.M., Vazquez-Ordas, C.J., 2009. Relation
between  occupational safety management and ﬁrm performance. Safety Science
47 (7), 980–991.
old,  A.H., Malhotra, A., Segars, A.H., 2001. Knowledge management: an organiza-
tional  capabilities perspective. Journal of Management Information Systems 18
(1), 185–214.
rant, R.M., 1996. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: orga-
nizational capability as knowledge integration. Organization Science 7 (4),
375–387.
rifﬁn,  M.A., Neal, A., 2000. Perceptions of safety at work: a framework for linking
safety climate to safety performance, knowledge, and motivation. Journal of
Occupational Health Psychology 5 (3), 347–358.
rote, G., 2007. Understanding and assessing safety culture through the
lens  of organizational management of uncertainty. Safety Science 45 (6),
637–652.
rote,  G., 2009. Management of Uncertainty: Theory and Application in the Design
of Systems and Organizations. Springer, London.d Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171
Grote, G., 2012. Safety management in different high-risk domains – all the same?
Safety Science 50 (10), 1983–1992.
Group, D.H.S., 2011. Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout.
Centre for Catastrophic Risk Management.
Guldenmund, F.W., 2000. The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and
research.  Safety Science 34 (1), 215–257.
Hackman, J.R., 1990. Groups that Work (and those that don’t): Creating Conditions
for  Effective Teamwork. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
Hayes, J., 2012. Operator competence and capacity – lessons from the Montara
blowout.  Safety Science 50 (3), 563–574.
Helfat, C.E., Winter, S.G., 2011. Untangling dynamic and operational capabilities:
strategy  for the (N)ever-changing world. Strategic Management Journal 32,
1243–1250.
Hofmann,  D.A., Stetzer, A., 1998. The role of safety climate and communication
in  accident interpretation: implications for learning from negative events.
Academy  of Management Journal 41 (6), 644–657.
Hollnagel, E., 2011. Prologue: the scope of resilience engineering. In: Hollnagel, E.,
Paries, J., Woods, D.D., Wreathall, J. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering in Practice: A
Guidebook. Ashgate, Burlington, pp. xxx–xxxix.
Hollnagel, E., Paries, J., Woods, D.D., Wreathall, J., 2011. Resilience Engineering in
Practice: A Guidebook. Ashgate, Burlington.
Hopkins, A., 2001. Was  three mile Island a ‘normal accident’? Journal of Contingen-
cies  and Crisis Management 9 (2), 65–72.
Hopkins, A., 2008. Failure to learn: The BP Texas City reﬁnery disaster. CCH, Australia.
Hopkins, A., 2009. Thinking about process safety indicators. Safety Science 47 (4),
460–465.
Hopkins, A., 2013. Issues in safety science. Safety Science, http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.s  sci.2013.01.0 07.
Hopkins, A., Hale, A., 2002. Issues in the regulation of safety: setting the scene. In:
Kirwan, B., Hale, A. (Eds.), Changing Regulation – Controlling Risks in Society.
Pergamon,  Amsterdam, NL, pp. 1–12.
HSE, 2005. Inspectors Toolkit. Human Factors in the Management of Major Accident
Hazards. Health and Safety Executive, UK.
Huselid, M.A., 1995. The impact of human resource management practices on
turnover, productivity, and corporate ﬁnancial performance. The Academy of
Management Journal 38 (3), 635–672.
ICAO, 2002. Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization.
ISO, 2000. International Standards Organisation IS) 9001 – Quality Management
System  Standards. ISO Standards, Geneva.
Kang, S.C., Snell, S.A., 2009. Intellectual capital architectures and ambidextrous
learning:  a framework for human resource management. Journal of Manage-
ment  Studies 46 (1), 65–92.
Kerzner, H., 2001. Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Sched-
uling, and Controlling. Wiley, New York.
LeCoze, J., 2013. Outlines of a sensitising model for industrial safety assessment.
Safety  Science 51 (1), 187–201.
Lenﬂe, S., Loch, C., 2010. Lost roots: how project management came to emphasize
control over ﬂexibility and novelty. California Management Review 53 (1 (Fall)),
32–55.
Lepak, D.P., Bartol, K.M., Erhardt, N.L., 2005. A contingency framework for the deliv-
ery of HR practices. Human Resource Management Review 15 (2), 139–159.
Leveson, N.G., 2011a. Systems Thinking Applied to Safety. MIT  Press, Massachusetts.
Leveson, N.G., 2011b. The use of safety cases in certiﬁcation and regulation. Journal
of System Safety 47 (6).
Leveson,  N.G., Dulac, N., Marais, K., Carroll, J., 2009. Moving beyond normal acci-
dents and high reliability organizations: a systems approach to safety in complex
systems.  Organization Studies 30 (2–3), 227–249.
Macgillivray, B.H., Sharp, J.V., Strutt, J.E., Hamilton, P.D., Pollard, S.J.T., 2007. Bench-
marking risk management within the international water utility sector. Part I:
Design of a capability maturity methodology. Journal of Risk Research 10 (1),
85–104.
Madni,  A.M., Jackson, S., 2009. Towards a conceptual framework for resilience engi-
neering. IEEE Systems Journal 3 (2), 181–191.
Maguire, R., 2008. Safety Cases and Safety Reports: Meaning, Motivation
and  Management, Retrieved from http://UWA.eblib.com.au/patron/
FullRecord.aspx?p=438804
Makin, A.M., Winder, C., 2008. A new conceptual framework to improve the appli-
cation of occupational health and safety management systems. Safety Science
46  (6), 935–948.
Marais, K., Dulac, N., Leveson, N.G.,2004. Beyond normal accidents and high reli-
ability organizations: the need for an alternative approach to safety in complex
systems.  In: Paper Presented at the Engineering Systems Division Symposium.
MIT,  Cambridge, MA.
Marks,  M.A., Mathieu, J.E., Zaccaro, S.J., 2001. A temporally based framework and
taxonomy of team processes. Academy of Management Review 26 (3), 356–376.
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S.M., Flin, R., 2003. Safety climate, safety management
practice  and safety performance in offshore environments. Safety Science 41
(8), 641–680.
Nahapiet, J., Ghoshal, S., 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organiza-
tional  advantage. Academy of Management Review 23 (2), 242–266.Nahrgang, J.D., Morgeson, F.P., Hofmann, D.A., 2011. Safety at work: a meta-
analytic  investigation of the link between job demands, job resources, burnout,
engagement,  and safety outcomes. Journal of Applied Psychology 96 (1),
71–94.
sis an
N
N
N
N
O
O
P
P
Q
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
S
Zohar, D., Luria, G., 2003. The use of supervisory practices as leverage to improve
safety behavior: a cross-level intervention model. Journal of Safety Research 34
(5), 567–577.M.A. Grifﬁn et al. / Accident Analy
ational Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 2011. Deep Water: The
Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. US Government, Washing-
ton,  DC.
eal, A., Grifﬁn, M.A., 2006. A study of the lagged relationships among safety climate,
safety motivation, safety behavior, and accidents at the individual and group
levels.  Journal of Applied Psychology 91 (4), 946–953.
elson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1982. An evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Belk-
nap Press, Cambridge.
orwegian HSE Framework Regulations, 2011.
’Reilly Iii, C.A., Tushman, M.L., 2008. Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: resolv-
ing the innovator’s dilemma. Research in Organizational Behavior 28, 185–206.
rton, J.D., Weick, K.E., 1990. Loosely coupled systems: a reconceptualization.
Academy of Management Review 15 (2), 203–223.
errow, C., 1984. Normal Accidents: Living with High-risk Technologies. Basic Books,
New York.
inheiro, A., Kuiper, C., 2011. Application and use of standardized safety question-
naires for contractor management in upstream oil and gas. In: Paper Presented
at  the SPE Health Safety Security and Environmental Conference.
uick,  B.L., Stephenson, M.T., Witte, K., Vaught, C., Booth-Butterﬁeld, S., Patel, D.,
2008. An examination of antecedents to coal miners’ hearing protection behav-
iors:  a test of the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Safety Research 39 (3),
329–338.
eason,  J.T., 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate, Alder-
shot.
eason, J.T., 2000. Human error: models and management. British Medical Journal
320 (7237), 768–770.
edinger,  C.F., Levine, S.P., 1998. Development and evaluation of the Michigan
Occupational  Health and Safety Management System Assessment Instrument: a
universal OHSMS performance measurement tool. American Industrial Hygiene
Association  59 (8), 572–581.
ijpma, J.A., 1997. Complexity, tight-coupling and reliability: connecting normal
accidents  theory and high reliability theory. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management 5 (1), 15–23.
oberts, K.H., 1990. Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organization.
Organization  Science 1 (2), 160–176.
oe, E., Schulman, P.R., 2008. High Reliability Management: Operating on the Edge.
Stanford University Press, Stanford.
oy, M.,  Fortier, L., Bergeron, S., 2004. Développement d’instruments de mesure
de  performance en santé et sécurité du travail à l’intention des entreprises
manufacturières organisées en équipes semi-autonomes de travail, Institut de
recherche Robert-Sauvé en santé et en sécurité du travail du Québec, Direction
des  communications.osenthal, I., Kleindorfer, P.R., Elliott, M.R., 2006. Predicting and conﬁrming the
effectiveness of systems for managing low-probability chemical process risks.
Process  Safety Progress 25 (2), 135–155.
chöbel, M.,  Manzey, D., 2011. Subjective theories of organizing and learning from
events. Safety Science 49 (1), 47–54.d Prevention 68 (2014) 156–171 171
Sgourou,  E., Katsakiori, P., Goutsos, S., Manatakis, E., 2010. Assessment of
selected  safety performance evaluation methods in regards to their con-
ceptual,  methodological and practical characteristics. Safety Science 48 (8),
1019–1025.
Shrivastava,  P., 2007. A typology of organizational learning systems. Journal of Man-
agement Studies 20 (1), 7–28.
Skogdalen, J.E., Vinnem, J.E., 2011. Quantitative risk analysis offshore – human and
organizational factors. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96, 468–479.
Stewart, T.A., 1997. Intellectual Capital, 1st ed. Doubleday Business, New York, NY.
Strutt, J.E., Sharp, J.V., Terry, E., Miles, R., 2006. Capability maturity models
for  offshore organisational management. Environment International 32 (8),
1094–1105.
Subramaniam, M.,  Youndt, M.A., 2005. The inﬂuence of intellectual capital on the
types of innovative capabilities. The Academy of Management Journal 48 (3),
450–463.
Teece,  D.J., 2007. Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations
of  (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal 28 (13),
1319–1350.
Tinmannsvik, R.K., Hovden, J., 2003. Safety diagnosis criteria – development and
testing. Safety Science 41 (7), 575–590.
UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, 2005.
Weick,  K.E., 1987. Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. California
Management  Review 29 (2), 112–127.
Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., 2001. Managing the Unexpected. Jossey-Bass, San
Francisco.
Weick,  K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., Obstfeld, D., 1999. Organizing for high reliability:
processes  of collective mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior 21,
23–81.
Winter, S.G., 2000. The satisfying principle in capability learning. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 21 (10–11), 981–996.
Winter, S.G., 2003. Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Jour-
nal 24 (10), 991–995.
Woods,  D.D., 2011. Resilience and the ability to anticipate. In: Hollnagel, E., Paries,
J., Woods, D.D., Wreathall, J. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering in Practice: A Guide-
book.  Ashgate, Burlington, pp. 127–143.
Youndt, M.A., Snell, S.A., 2004. Human resource conﬁgurations, intellectual capital,
and organizational performance. Journal of Managerial Issues 16, 337–360.
Zacharatos, A., Barling, J., Iverson, R.D., 2005. High-performance work systems and
occupational safety. Journal of Applied Psychology 90 (1), 77–93.Zollo, M.,  Winter, S.G., 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capa-
bilities. Organization Science 13 (3), 339–351.
